Sketch of Condorcet's Sketch
by Caspar Hewett
Click here for printer friendly version of this page
Condorcet’s Sketch for an Historical Picture of the Progress of the
Human Mind was written in the last few months of his life when on the
run, having been condemned to death in the wake of the French Revolution.
In hiding as he was, and in fear of his life, he found himself, rather than
writing another polemic, or trying to justify his actions, deciding to devote
the time left to him to writing a work of lasting utility to humanity.
While it
is clearly related to much that had already been written about the rights of
man, and discarding the superstition and authority of the past, this was a
very different type of work. Through an historical study of the development
of human thought, Condorcet hoped to point the way towards future
improvement of the human condition. His history consists of nine “grand
epochs” of the past, and a tenth epoch in which he advances “some
conjectures upon the future destiny of mankind.” However, while his
description certainly has time dependence running it, with a corresponding
advance in human understanding and material well being, Condorcet is clear
that progress is uneven. This is not a naïve view of a continual improvement
in the human conditions – not everyone benefits from advances that are
made; knowledge and wealth are not always shared; and the states described
in each epoch actually frequently run alongside each other. He is explicit in
pointing out that there are even people who still live in states corresponding
to the first and second epochs. However, part of the point of recognising the
progress that has already been made is to point to a trajectory towards a
better future state.
First epoch: Men united into hordes
Condorcet’s first epoch is that in which humans lived as hunter gatherers.
Initially families lived together, but people eventually congregated into
hordes consisting of several distinct families. There were the beginnings of
the
art of fabricating arms, of preparing aliments, of procuring the utensils
requisite for this preparation, of preserving these aliments as a provision
against the seasons in which it was impossible to procure a fresh supply of
them – these arts, confined to the most simple wants, were the fruits of a
continued union, and the first features that distinguished human society
from the society observable in many species of beasts.
It also saw “the origin of the first political institutions” in the form of chiefs
emerging and the exclusion of women from decision making. Condorcet
explicitly assumes that “language must have preceded these institutions.”
He also draws attention to two kinds of progress that belong equally to the
human species – that instigated by individual intelligence and collective
developments (“the formation of the bow was the work of a single man of
genius; the formation of a language that of the whole society.”) Even in this
first epoch Condorcet supposed there was a separation between people into
those “destined to teach,” whether based on real knowledge or deceit, and
those that follow, adding, in typically disdainful fashion, “we still see the
remains in our priests.”
Second epoch: Pastoral state of mankind. – transition from that to the
agricultural state
This period was characterised by the domestication of animals for food,
milk and materials for clothing. People began to live less tiring way of life –
living well beyond mere subsistence, allowing some time for the
development of the mind. In this period differences in wealth were first
established, as was the custom of retaining prisoners of war as slaves rather
than killing them. Altruism and charity also first appear in this period –
arising from differences in wealth. The idea of property and its associated
rights developed, specifically related to inheritance, and there was a
consequent inequality of political rights.
Condorcet supposes that the power of those who claimed supernatural
insights first appeared in this epoch, attacking the church again, describing
religion as “the art of deceiving men in order to rob them, and of assuming
over their opinions an authority founded upon the hopes and fears of the
imagination.” It also saw the enrichment of language and improvement of
poetry, song and musical instruments, all as a consequence of increased
leisure time. Three classes of people emerged – proprietors, the domestics of
their family and slaves. He adds:
it will be seen why the progress of the mind has not been at all times
accompanied with an equal progress towards happiness and virtue; and
how the leaven of prejudices and errors has polluted the good that should
flow from knowledge, a good which depends more on the purity of that
knowledge than its extent.
Third epoch: Progress of mankind from the agricultural state to the
invention of alphabetical writing
The third epoch saw the growth of land ownership and a resulting increase
in the wealth of proprietors, who withdrew the fruits of others’ labour.
There was an increasing division of labour and specialisation. Animal
husbandry, tool-making and expansion of commerce developed. Two new
classes of people appeared – artisans and merchants. There was a move to
education outside of family unit for the wealthy. There was also greater
equality between the sexes as wives became more that “simple units of
utility.” In some places people began to congregate in towns. Thus we see
the creation of kingdoms and chiefdoms – also the first appearance of real
power for individuals, and the associated corruption, resulting in some of
the powerful commissioning “arbitrary acts of violence.” As a result, where
“the excesses of these families exhausted the patience of the people” the
first republics emerged. This was a period of conquest and despotism;
empires with people of one country imposing their will on the people of
another. Out of this came new classes – “the descendants of the conquering
nation and those of the oppressed; an hereditary nobility” and “a people
condemned to labour, to dependence, to a state of degradation, but not to
slavery” in addition to slaves. The consequent intercourse between countries
hastened the progress of various arts such as dyeing, making pottery and
working metals. In the more sedentary and peaceable societies there was a
(very slow) increase in knowledge of astronomy, medicine, anatomy and the
beginnings of the study of natural phenomena. This was not real scientific
knowledge as there was no methodical investigation, but rather, simple
empirical laws obtained through observation. There was also the invention
of “the ingenious idea of arithmetical scales” and the development of
hieroglyphic writing which greatly increased the powers of the mind.
However, those with power used these tools and knowledge
not to enlighten, but to govern the mind, they not only avoided
communicating to the people the whole of their knowledge, but adulterated
with errors such portions as they thought proper to disclose. They taught
not what they believed to be true, but what they thought favourable to their
own ends.
Thus they developed “two doctrines, one for themselves, the other for the
people.” Finally came the invention of alphabetic writing in Asia, a
powerful development that in time spread to Greece, where the next epoch
began.
Fourth epoch: Progress of the mind in Greece, until the division of the
sciences about the age of Alexander
Condorcet here discusses the early Greeks, describing the period as that of
the “first dawn of philosophy and first advance of the sciences.” While he
points out that the origins of much of Greek thought was in the east, he
emphasises the importance of new institutional structures, in particular the
creation of republics, in providing the individual freedom necessary to
making progress in the search for knowledge. Political freedom allowed for
independence of mind. This meant that the sciences, rather than remaining
the preserve of the few, became accessible to many. The philosophers, the
“friends of science and wisdom” wanted to understand the nature of
humanity, the gods and the origin of the world. They tried “to reduce nature
to a single principle and the phenomena of the universe to one law” and
“attempted to include, in a single rule of conduct, all the duties of morality,
and the secret of true happiness.” However, a number of factors held them
back from making as much progress as they might otherwise have done.
First, they were over-ambitious in “fixing the attention upon questions
incapable perhaps for ever of being solved.” Secondly, they neglected
observation and relied on imagination. Thirdly, rather than seeking precision
and accuracy in the language they used, they played on the meaning of
words, purposely expressing different ideas with the same phrases,
something that was not conducive to developing sound science.
Despite these limitations notable advances were made in geometry and
astronomy. In the work of Democritus and Pythagoras the seeds of
Cartesian and Newtonian thought can be found: Democritus thought all
phenomena were a “result of the combinations and motions of simple
bodies” and Pythagoras believed that all natural phenomena were governed
by “general laws capable of being ascertained by calculation.” Socrates,
who cried to the Greeks to “recall to the earth this philosophy which had
lost itself in the clouds,” respected astronomy, geometry and the observation
of nature. His death is marked in the history of human thought as “the first
crime” in the “war between philosophy and superstition.” The priests, afraid
of the rise of reason, persecuted the philosophers, accusing them of impiety
to the gods. Socrates, aware of the risks he was running in his pursuit of
truth, “announced to the priests that truth alone was the end he had in view;
that he did not wish to enforce upon men a new system” but wanted to teach
them to use their own reason. This, of all crimes, was considered the worst
by the priestly cast. Socrates disciple, Plato, was more cautious. He used his
master’s voice to explore his philosophical questions, taking care that
Socrates “is made to express himself with the modesty of doubt.” The
schools that followed were united “by the ties of a liberal fraternity, men
intent upon penetrating the secrets of nature.” These schools, or sects, were
extremely important in keeping a “taste for philosophy” alive, especially
since printing had yet to be invented, limiting the spread of ideas. Their
retention of the need for freedom of thought ensured that the degradation of
reason was not to be feared.
Condorcet moves on to a discussion of the political thought that emerged
from the different sects. He is not interested in the details of their ideas, but
in the general errors they made in their understanding and from where they
came. A key problem is that slavery was the norm in their society and thus
even “the most perfect forms of government had for their object the liberty
or happiness of at most but half the human species.” Much of their political
thought also made the error of appealing to common prejudices and vices
rather than trying to dispel them. Thus they often used arguments that were
intentionally misleading. However, despite their limitations, they were
successful in proposing almost every form of institution that can be found in
modern states, a truly remarkable achievement. Even political economy, a
relatively new development in Condorcet’s time, is presupposed by Greek
thought.
Finally, Condorcet draws attention to the rise of the fine arts, which reached
during this epoch “a degree of perfection known at that time to no other
people, and scarcely equalled since by almost any nation.” He suggests that
this development is intimately connected to the social structures that
appeared in this period, in particular “the fall of tyrants and the formation of
republics,” arguing that the vices of the Greeks were remnants of previous
eras, and that “the progress of virtue has ever accompanied that of
knowledge, as the progress of corruption has always followed or announced
its decline.”
Fifth Epoch. Progress of the Sciences, From their Division to their
Decline
In this epoch Condorcet begins with the late Greeks, moving through the
rise and fall of the Roman Empire to the growth of Christianity, and the
subsequent decline in philosophy and the natural sciences. He begins by
sketching the contributions made by a selection of the Greek thinkers and
sects, picking out what he sees as the key strengths and weaknesses of their
thought.
Aristotle embraced all the sciences and extended the methods of philosophy
to all areas of human endeavour. The more comprehensive his vision
became, the more he saw the need to separate different areas of knowledge,
“fixing with greater precision the limits of each.” His history of animals
provided the foundations for accurate observation and description of the
natural world, although he failed to apply the same rigour to other natural
sciences. The main problem was the lack of the experimental method, which
had yet to be conceived. Thus, most of the progress in the natural sciences
made in this epoch was hit on by chance.
Archimedes, whose life “forms an epoch in the history of man,” developed
the theory of limits and the calculus of infinities, using his methods to
calculate the surface area of a sphere and calculate the value of ? more
accurately than any of his predecessors. He also developed the theory of the
lever and discovered the principle “that a body immersed in any fluid, loses
a portion of its weight equal to the mass of water displaced.”
Discussing along the way Epicurus, the Academics and the stoics,
Condorcet points to the way the mathematical and physical sciences
transcended the difference between different thinkers and schools. This was
due to their foundation in calculation and observation. This independence,
combined with the usefulness of the knowledge for navigation and
commerce, ensured its survival as the Greek states fell and Rome ascended.
Condorcet is scathing of the rise of the new religion which came out of
decline of the Roman Empire – Christianity:
Contempt for the human sciences was one of the first features of
Christianity … it feared that spirit of investigation and doubt, that
confidence of man in his own reason, the pest alike of all religious creeds.
The light of the natural sciences … was regarded … as being a dangerous
enemy to the success of miracles: and there is no religion that does not
oblige its sectaries to swallow some physical absurdities. The triumph of
Christianity was thus the signal of the entire decline both of the sciences
and philosophy.
Unfortunately, since printing had yet to be invented, many great works were
lost to posterity in the period that followed, and it was only because some
knowledge found asylum in the East that any of the works of the previous
period were later recovered. What is more, there grew towards the end of
this epoch a tendency to revere ancient works, not based on their merit, but
on the names of the authors; “to found belief upon authority, rather than
upon reason.”
Sixth Epoch. Decline of Learning, to its Restoration about the Period of the
Crusades
Condorcet describes the period of the rise of feudalism as “the disastrous
epoch” in which “Ignorance marches in triumph.” It was characterised by
“theological reveries, superstitious delusions … religious intolerance …
tyranny and military despotism.” In the West “the decline was more rapid
and absolute” while in the East “the decline was slower.” However, it did at
least see the end of domestic slavery, which was to have far reaching
consequences.
Most of what Condorcet describes as the “barbarian nations” established
new social relations, typically ruled over by a king, with a council that
“pronounced judgements and made most decisions,” an “assembly of
private chiefs,” and an “assembly of the people.” A new form of power over
the people developed with the emergence of a nobility who had access to
iron armour and shields to protect themselves and their horses, and who
wielded the weapons of the age with skill – the lance, club and sword. In
this “feudal anarchy,” “the people groaned under the triple tyranny of kings,
leaders of armies and priests.” However, there were a few institutions that
helped to preserve “some feeble idea” of the rights of men, and thus “were
destined one day to serve as an index to their recognition and restoration.”
Rome, which managed to retain “a sort of independence,” commanded in
the name of God, imposing
a new species of chains; its pontiffs subjugating ignorant credulity by acts
grossly forged; mixing religion with all the transactions of civil life, to
render them more subservient to their avarice or their pride;
In this epoch the church invented “a multitude of duties purely religious,
and of imaginary sins.” The idea of absolution for a tariff was created,
solidifying the power of the clergy and making it rich: “They sold so much
land in heaven for an equal quantity of land upon earth.” The monks
invented miracles old and new in order to deceive and rob the people.
In the East, some of the old knowledge survived: “the inhabitants of
Constantinople could still read Homer and Sophocles, Thucydides and
Plato.”
At the edge of Asia next came Mohammed, “a man of ardent enthusiasm
and most profound policy, born with the talents of a poet, as well as a
warrior … At once legislator, prophet, priest, judge, and general of the
army, he was in possession of all the means of subjugating the mind.” His
influence was “to change the face of three quarters of the globe.”
The Arabs studied Aristotle, cultivated astronomy, optics and medicine, and
introduced some new ideas into science: they generalised the application of
algebra and made the first steps in the development of chemistry as a
scientific discipline. The sciences were free, although “the people were
subjected to the unmitigated despotism of religion.”
Seventh Epoch. From the First Progress of the Sciences about the Period of
their Revival in the West, to the Invention of the Art of Printing
It is in this period that “human reason began to recover the recollection of
its rights and its liberty.” Condorcet begins by describing the growth of
opposition to Catholicism: There was a reaction against the power of both
the clergy and the kings which resulted in some new freedoms and an
increase in the number of people “who enjoyed the common right of
citizens.” It was also the period of the holy crusades which, while they
aimed to strengthen Christianity’s hand and were thus “undertaken with
superstitious views,” in practice they “served to destroy superstition.” This
was thanks to the resulting contact between Europeans and Arabians that
helped to restore the knowledge of the ancients in Europe.
The rediscovery of the work of the ancient Greeks, especially Aristotle,
transformed education and revived the art of reasoning. However “this
method could not fail to retard in the schools the advancement of the natural
sciences,” and thus it failed at this point to lead to the discovery of much
knowledge. Nevertheless, two discoveries helped to revolutionise the period
– the compass and gunpowder.
Huge changes took place in the social systems throughout Europe.
Republics were formed, independent towns and states emerged,
constitutions were written and the power of the kings and feudal laws were
undermined. In England the Magna Carta established certain rights of the
King's subjects. Elsewhere similar charters were agreed, foretelling the
declarations of the rights of man that would follow in the next epoch.
One outcome of the invention of firearms is that it changed society in a way
only indirectly related to warfare. Sheer numbers of people, the size of an
army, were no longer the main factor in winning a battle. The means to
afford firearms became far more important;
wealth can balance force; even the most warlike people feel the necessity
of providing and securing the means of combating, by the acquisition of
the riches of commerce and the arts.
Meanwhile, changes in language, influenced by a new “taste for letters and
poetry,” were beginning to transform the arts. Here Condorcet gives brief
mention of Dante, Boccaccio and Petrarch whose genius set in motion the
Renaissance that was to come. At this time the idea that “the rights of man
were written in the book of nature” came back to the fore. However,
it was only in the sacred books, in respected authors, … in registers of old
usages, and in the annals of the church, that maxims or examples were
sought from which to infer those rights … Thus the authority of men was
everywhere substituted for that of reason: books were much more studied
than nature, and the opinions of antiquity obtained the preference over the
phenomena of the universe.”
Eighth Epoch. From the Invention of Printing, to the Period when the
Sciences and Philosophy Threw off the Yoke of Authority
Condorcet opens this section with a lengthy discussion of the consequences
of the invention of the printing press, summed up by the following sentence:
“All those means which render the progress of the human mind more easy,
more rapid, more certain, are also the benefits of the press.” It freed the
people from “every political and religious chain; it was harder to stifle
knowledge as it became almost impossible to destroy every copy of a given
book.
Two other momentous events took place around the same time: the taking of
Constantinople by the Turks, which had “an immediate influence on the
progress of knowledge,” and the “discovery of both the new world, and of
the route which has opened to Europe a direct communication with the
eastern parts of Africa and Asia” on which the influence “on the destiny of
the whole human species can never cease but with the species itself.”
It is in this epoch only of the progress of the human mind, that man has
arrived at the knowledge of the globe which he inhabits; that he has been
able to study, in all its countries, the species to which he belongs, modified
by the continued influence of natural causes, or social institutions; that he
has had the opportunity of observing the productions of the earth, or of the
sea, in all temperatures and climates … But these advantages will never
expiate what the discoveries have cost to suffering humanity, till the
moment when Europe, abjuring the sordid and oppressive system of
commercial monopoly, shall acknowledge that men of all climates, equals
and brothers by the will of nature, have never been formed to nourish the
pride and avarice of a few privileged nations; till, better informed
respecting its true interests, it shall invite all the people of the earth to
participate in its independence, its liberty and its illumination.
Condorcet discusses next the rise of Protestantism and the backlash that
followed it. However, despite the attempts of the Catholic Church to stifle
free thought and persecute those that spoke against it, it failed to stop new
ideas from spreading. The rediscovery of the ancient Greeks aided the
development of free thinking, as philosophers began again to use their own
reason, arguing about the claims of different doctrines. Finding themselves
persecuted, philosophers were cautious, and often decided not to expose
themselves, meaning that freedom of thought developed only to a limited
extent, staying within the confines of Christianity.
However the time was ripe for change and
some generous individuals … revealed this grand truth to the world: that
liberty is a blessing which cannot be alienated … that the people have the
right of withdrawing an authority originating in themselves alone,
whenever that authority shall be abused, or shall cease to be thought useful
to the interests of the community …
Little “actual progress” towards freedom was made in this epoch, but many
changes were made to laws and institutions that meant that future change
became more of a possibility. In fact, the epoch was “blotted” by religious
massacres, holy wars, the depopulation of the new world, and slavery even
more barbarous than that of ancient times.
On the other hand, great strides were made in the sciences and arts.
Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler transformed our understanding of the
heavens, while “the arts of epic poetry, painting and sculpture, arrived at a
perfection unknown to the ancients.” There was an understanding that,
while “it was still necessary to examine what had been done by the
ancients,” people “were entitled to judge them” and apply their own reason.
The end of the epoch was marked by the genius of “three extraordinary
personages,” Bacon, Galileo and Descartes, each of whom made a unique
contribution that helped lay the foundations for the scientific revolution.
Bacon set out a method based on observation, experiment and calculation
and argued that the philosopher should “renounce every creed he had
received” and rely on his own judgement. Galileo, as well as making a
number of brilliant discoveries, “founded the first school in which the
sciences have been taught without a mixture of superstition, prejudice, or
authority.” Descartes made a significant contribution to the study of optics,
developed a new branch of mathematics and, most importantly, had the
boldness to attempt “to extend his method to every object of human
intelligence.”
Ninth Epoch. From the Time of Descartes, to the Formation of the French
Republic
This is the epoch, according to Condorcet, when humanity “completed its
emancipation.” At its opening some countries had developed limited
freedoms, but despotism was still rife and religious intolerance fierce.
However, philosophy was gaining
influence on the thinking class of men, and these on the people and their
governments, that, ceasing any longer to be gradual, produced a revolution
in the entire mass of certain nations, and gave thereby a secure pledge of
the general revolution one day to follow that shall embrace the whole of
the human species.
Thinkers finally
arrived at the knowledge of the true rights of man, which they deduced
from this simple principle: that he is a being endowed with sensation,
capable of reasoning upon and understanding his interests, and of
acquiring moral ideas.
They recognised that maintaining those rights “was the only object of
political union,” and that “the will of the majority is the only principle
which can be followed by all, without infringing upon the common
equality.” Thus the individual engages to comply with the will of the
majority, which in turn makes that engagement unanimity.
It was now no longer practicable to divide mankind into two species, one
destined to govern, the other to obey, one to deceive, the other to be dupes:
the doctrine was obliged universally to be acknowledged, that all have an
equal right to be enlightened respecting their interests, to share in the
acquisition of truth, and no political authorities appointed by the people for
the benefit of the people, can be entitled to keep them in ignorance and
darkness.
There follows a discussion of many the breakthroughs made in the period,
beginning with the thought of Locke and Leibniz, and paying tribute to
those who disseminated truth as well as those who discovered it, including
Collins, Bolingbroke, Bayle, Fontanelle and Montesquieu.
Thus there prevailed a general knowledge of the natural rights of man; the
opinion even that these rights are inalienable and imprescriptible; a
decided partiality for freedom of thinking and writing; for the
enfranchisement of industry and commerce; for the improvement of the
condition of the people; for the repeal of penal statutes against religious
nonconformists; for the abolition of torture and barbarous punishments;
the desire for a milder system of criminal legislation; of a jurisprudence
that should give to innocence a complete security; of a civil code more
simple, as well as more conformable to reason and justice; indifference as
to systems of religion, considered at length as the offspring of superstition,
or ranked in the number of political inventions; hatred of hypocrisy and
fanaticism; contempt for prejudices; and lastly, a zeal for the propagation
of truth; These principles … became the common creed.
A major outcome of these changes was the American declaration of
independence from Britain. This was the first example “of a great people
throwing off at once every species of chains, and peaceably framing for
itself the form of government and the laws that it judged would be most
conducive to its happiness.” War ensued and the Americans successfully
freed themselves of the domination of Britain.
The French Revolution followed quickly in its wake. The French had much
more to change than the Americans as they suffered a corrupt system of
finance, feudal tyranny, hereditary distinction, privilege of corporations and
a system of religious intolerance to destroy. Thus they attempted to
overthrow at one blow “the despotism of kings, the political inequality of
constitutions partially free, the pride and prerogatives of nobility, the
domination, intolerance, and rapacity of priests, and the enormity of feudal
claims.” What made this task harder still was the lack of allies the
revolution found in other states of Europe since such radical change posed a
threat to all of France’s neighbours. However, consequence of the
immensity of their challenge is that the constitution and laws that came out
of the revolution were “more pure, accurate and profound” than those of the
Americans.
Condorcet moves on to consider the breakthroughs made in the natural
sciences, discussing Newton and d’Alembert and explaining how their
approach delivered natural philosophy “from the vague explanations of
Descartes” making it “nothing more than the art of interrogating nature by
experiment, for the purpose of afterwards deducing more general facts by
computation.” In this period, chemistry, as it turned away from the chimera
of turning base metals into gold, became truly experimental, while natural
history, gaining from advances made in other sciences began to exhibit true
rigour in its methods of study. Anatomy, while gaining greatly from the
collapse of the “superstitious respect for the dead” of previous epochs,
failed to advance as much as other subjects, primarily because “the nature of
its object deprives it of” the means to experiment open to the other sciences.
The mechanical arts, architecture and economics also “advanced with
greater certainty” thanks to advances made in the sciences.
Notable in Condorcet’s description is the recognition of the interdependence
of the sciences. However, what he considers perhaps the most important
consequence of the increase in scientific knowledge is “that prejudice has
been destroyed, and the human understanding somewhat rectified” after the
absurdity of belief, terror and superstition imposed on it by religion. For him
the spread and popularisation of scientific understanding will ultimately
serve to improve politics, morality and the arts. His is an optimistic view:
While we thus take a general view of the human species, we may prove
that the discovery of true methods in all the sciences; the extent of the
theories they include; their application to all the objects of nature, and all
the wants of man; the lines of communication established between them;
the greater number of those who cultivate them; and lastly, the
multiplication of printing presses, are sufficient to assure us, that none of
them will hereafter descend below the point to which they have been
carried. We may show that the principles of philosophy, the maxims of
liberty, the knowledge of the true rights of man, and his real interest, are
spread over too many nations, and in each of those nations direct the
opinions of too great a number of enlightened men, for them ever to fall
again into oblivion.
However, Condorcet acknowledges the severe limitations to the spread of
information in the world at the time of his writing. There were still “vast
countries groaning under slavery” and others “still vegetating in the infancy
of” the early age of humanity’s progress. Thus, while the human mind had
progressed greatly, little had been done for “the perfection of the human
species; much for the glory of man, somewhat for his liberty, but scarcely
anything yet for his happiness. In a few directions, our eyes are struck with
dazzling light; but thick darkness still covers and immense horizon.” These
thoughts bring Condorcet to the “last link of the chain, that the observation
of past events … become truly useful” in deciding the future destiny of
humanity.
Tenth Epoch. Future Progress of Mankind
Here Condorcet presents his view of what he hopes the future will hold. He
begins by reducing them to three points: “the destruction of inequality
between nations; the progress of equality in one and the same nation; and,
lastly, the real improvement of man.” He asks:
Will not every nation one day arrive at the state of civilisation attained by
those people who are most enlightened, most free, most exempt from
prejudices, as the French for instance, and the Anglo-Americans? Will not
the slavery of countries subjected to kings, the barbarity of African tribes,
and the ignorance of savages gradually vanish? Is there upon the face of
the globe a single spot the inhabitants of which are condemned by nature
never to enjoy liberty, never to exercise their reason?
… In a word, will not men be continually verging towards that state, in
which all will possess the requisite knowledge for conducting themselves
in the common affairs of life by their own reason, and of maintaining that
reason uncontaminated by prejudices; in which they will understand their
rights, and exercise them according to their opinion and their conscience;
in which all will be able, by the development of their faculties, to procure
the certain means of providing for their wants; lastly, in which folly and
wretchedness will be accidents, happening only now and then, and not the
habitual lot of a considerable portion of society?
In fine, may it not be expected that the human race will be meliorated by
new discoveries in the sciences and the arts, and … by the real
improvement of our faculties, moral, intellectual and physical …?
Condorcet’s answer to these questions is clear; that history of progress to
date suggests that “nature has fixed no limits to our hopes.” He is convinced
that the European nations will soon be transformed from oppressors and
conquerors of Africa and Asia to “instruments of benefit, and the generous
champions of their redemption from bondage.” What is more, the road to
progress in the undeveloped nations will be much faster and surer as they
will benefit from “the simple truths and infallible methods” that have
already been found in the West.
Noting that “there is frequently a considerable distinction between the rights
which the law acknowledges in the citizens of a state and those which they
really enjoy” due to inequalities in wealth, access to resources and
education, Condorcet argues that “these three kinds of real inequality must
continually diminish; but without becoming absolutely extinct.”
Certain that there is no limit to “the absolute perfection of the human
species,” Condorcet makes the case for the improvements necessary to
move towards that perfect state. First he argues for universal education as a
means to reducing all types of inequality. Not only would this make it
harder for a minority to deceive the majority, as has happened in the past,
but would also ensure that progress of both the sciences and the arts
accelerated indefinitely. For him it is obvious that the sciences are in their
infancy and thus it is impossible to attempt to set limits to any area of
human endeavour. In one striking prediction he seems to foretell the green
and industrial revolutions:
A smaller portion of ground will … produce a proportion of provisions of
higher value or greater utility; … each individual, with a less quantity of
labour, will labour more successfully, and be surrounded with greater
conveniences.
Addressing the question of whether population will grow too large he asks:
who shall presume to foretell to what perfection the art of converting the
elements of life into substances suited for our use may, in a progression of
ages, be brought?
In a similar vein, with regard to the political and moral sciences, he asks:
Among the variety, almost infinite, of possible systems, in which the
general principles of equality and natural rights should be respected, have
we yet fixed upon the precise rules of ascertaining with certainty those
which best secure the preservation of these rights, which afford the freest
scope for their exercise and enjoyment, which promote most effectually the
peace and welfare of individuals, and the strength, repose and prosperity of
nations?
He proposes that the application of the arithmetic of combinations and
probabilities to morality and politics may one day afford some answers to
this question. Further, he suggests that the refinement of language,
providing ever improving accuracy in the comprehension of ideas, could
contribute to the indefinite improvement of the moral and political realms.
He argues that “total annihilation of the prejudices which have established
between the sexes an inequality of rights” would be one of the most
important improvements that could be made. He also maintains that, as
people become more enlightened, they
will learn by degrees to regard war as the most dreadful of all calamities,
the most terrible of all crimes … Nations will know, that they cannot
become conquerors without losing their freedom; … that their object
should be security, and not power.
Two other factors have their part to play in Condorcet’s vision. He describes
the first as “technical methods,” by which he means arranging and
systematizing objects in order to “perceive at a glance their bearings and
connections, seize in an instant their combinations, and form from them the
more readily new combinations.” The second is the introduction of a
universal language for use in the sciences which would facilitate precision
of description and thus mutual understanding. He adds that the main
obstacle to achieving this “would be the humiliating necessity of
acknowledging how few precise ideas, and accurately defined notions,
understood exactly in the same sense in every mind, we really possess.”
Finally, Condorcet discusses human life expectancy, which he predicts will
increase indefinitely, and that the “middle term of life” will be characterised
by more constant health and a more robust constitution. This will be brought
about in part by medical advance, but more importantly by the ending of
“penury and wretchedness on the one hand, and of enormous wealth on the
other.”
Notes written by Caspar J M Hewett for
Progress of the Human Mind: From Enlightenment to Postmodernism
A workshop held in September 2008 as part of
The Great Debate Tenth Anniversary
Top of page