by Caspar Hewett
John Dupre at the
Café Scientifique, Monday 16th September 2002
Steven Pinker in conversation with
Matt Ridley, International Centre for Life, Wednesday 25th
September 2002
Newcastle has recently been host to two interesting and highly contrasting speakers. The first, John
Dupre, Professor of Philosophy of Science and Head of Sociology at the University of Exeter, opened
the fourth season of Newcastle's
Café Scientifique at the Live Theatre. Café Scientifique is the now well
established series of monthly sessions organised by PEALS at which invited speakers give short talks
followed by question and answer sessions, providing a welcome addition to intellectual life in
Newcastle. The second, Steven Pinker, Professor of Psychology at MIT, appeared in conversation
with Matt Ridley as part of the University of Newcastle's public lecture programme, 'Insights,' and was
the first of its type to be held in the conference centre at the International Centre for Life.
John Dupre, whose recent publications include 'Human Nature and the Limits of Science' and
'Humans and Other Animals,' entitled his talk 'Beyond Human Genetics.' He opened by emphasising
the difference between genomics and genetics. Genomics is the study of the genome and, for Dupre,
the important point here is that the genome interacts with the world - developmental and
environmental considerations are just as important as the genes themselves in understanding the
genome. He pointed out that less than 10% of the genome are instructions - despite the huge length
of the DNA sequence which makes up the genome, there are only a few genes. This has only been
understood recently and has made us realise that a single gene contributes to building many different
proteins. This has important implications when we consider the number of genes we share with other
animals - for having a particular gene in common is no guarantee that the function of that gene is the
same or even similar.
Emphasising this further, Dupre argued that we don't even know what a gene is - the concept of a
gene as a 'particle' passing on a specific trait, which originates with the work of Mendel in the 19th
century, is no longer useful and is deeply problematic in relation to current understanding. In
evolutionary theory using the phrase 'gene for . . .' has a well-defined meaning tempered by the reality
of what genes are, but when the term gets picked up and used in crude ways by others it loses all of
its subtlety and meaning. Media stories about discovering 'the gay gene' and 'genes for violence' for
example show how this language can lead to fundamental misconceptions.
Dupre went on to state that it is possible that some dispositions are inherited but that, because of the
enormously complex interactions between biological and environmental influences, there are few
implications to this. He added that there are some cases where 'gene for . . .' is a useful concept. For
example in certain kinds of monogenetic diseases where identification of a specific gene could be
useful for therapeutic purposes. The concept is also adequate for describing inheritance of certain
superficial features such as eye colour.
These point made, Dupre argued that genetics is not a useful basis for any kind of human typology.
He pointed to the superficiality of biologically based classifications of people, for example race is
biologically trivial because of the amount of genetic variation within any racial group, which heavily
exceeds that generally found between two individuals (be they of the same race or not). For Dupre,
then, there is really nothing very special about genes; they are ascribed an exaggerated uniqueness
in evolutionary theory. The range of things required to make a human are vast: Cells, parents, society,
food, sun etc. make human beings and the fact is human development requires all of these things.
The old nature-nurture debate should be long buried as we have come to recognise the part played
by both.
Dupre drew attention to the theory of development which developed separately from the theory of
evolution and which Dupre sees as running counter to the 'ultra-Darwinian' approach of theorists such
as Richard Dawkins. Developmental systems theory considers the complete lifecycle of an organism
as the unit of selection, in strong contrast to Dawkins who invites us in 'The Selfish Gene' to forget
about development when we consider natural selection.
Dupre strongly disagrees with Steven Pinker and other proponents of Evolutionary Psychology.
Evolutionary Psychology argues that human beings are adapted to a life very different to the one we
live. The argument runs that our ancestors lived as hunter gatherers on the savannahs of Africa, and
it is under these conditions that we evolved into what we are today. Thus we can best understand the
human mind, our predispositions and preferences in terms of the traits those early humans needed to
survive. According to the evolutionary psychologists many of modern human's psychological
problems can be explained in this way. Dupre thinks there is no reason to take this atavistic view. He
sees humans as having evolved greatly despite little or no change in the genome because of social
change. This is not proposing a blank slate theory, but is a recognition that there are different
developmental systems in play - 'How the Flintstones lived does not have to guide how we live now
or in the future.' In conclusion, Dupre called for the need to 'emancipate genomics from its history.'
Steven Pinker, speaking at the International Centre for Life 9 days later, could not have provided
more of a contrasting view. Matt Ridley opened the proceedings by giving a brief introduction to
Pinker, whose new book 'The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature,' was the subject of
discussion. The blank slate of the title refers to the notion that our minds are shaped entirely by our
experience. His book is both an attack on this idea and an argument for an alternative view. Pinker
rather thinks that all humans are born with a common set of predispositions and abilities which come
from our evolutionary past. These are what he describes as human nature. Along with other
exponents of Evolutionary Psychology, Pinker attempts to explain the roots of the behaviour of
modern humans in terms of abilities that our ancestors of 100,000 years ago needed to survive. He
applies this thinking to a whole range of subjects from the differences between the sexes to parenting
to violence.
Pointing out that 'The Blank Slate' is his most political book to date, Matt Ridley asked Steven Pinker
why he considered the blank slate idea to be an extreme position. Pinker thinks it to be an incoherent
idea; 'Blank slates don't do anything,' whereas the human mind does many things; he pointed to two
examples; that we are all born with a natural ability to use language and that babies appear to have
distinct preferences and characters from birth.
Matt Ridley then asked who is denying that we are born with some predispositions. Is Pinker 'beating
a straw man with a dead horse?' Pinker doesn't think so. He hears the blank slate idea being asserted
by academics and politicians alike; for example in the area of research on parenting there is an
implicit assumption that parental practice shapes a child, especially in the discussion of problem
behaviour such as violence. Many argue that violence is learned behaviour and there is a cycle of
violence passed on across the generations. According to Pinker such arguments are flawed since
they ignore the fact that parents give their children genes. He argues that the results of research will
remain ambiguous unless it is done with adopted children. This is familiar territory for Pinker. In 'The
Blank Slate' he argues that violence has an evolutionary logic, but that we are programmed to
develop contingent strategies for violence; 'Animals deploy aggression in highly selective ways and
humans are, of course, even more calculating. Most people today live their adult lives without ever
pressing their violence buttons.'
There is a contradiction that runs through this argument. On the one hand Pinker is anxious to
emphasise that we all share a genetic predisposition to violent behaviour, on the other he recognises
that social progress has led to a situation in which violence is generally seen as repugnant. Pinker
refuses to recognise that this is contradictory. He finds himself accused of 'saying it's all in the genes'
when he is actually only saying that it is 50% in the genes, but surely this is not the point. His
emphasis on aspects of human behaviour such as violence makes people uncomfortable and rightly
so. For why choose one of the most negative aspects of human behaviour as the focus of study when
we are equally disposed towards co-operation, say? Violence, and in particular male violence,
appears as a strong motif in much Evolutionary Psychology - take for example Wrangham and
Peterson's 'Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence' and seems to reflect a strongly
anti-humanistic view. Missing is the image of humankind in control of its own destiny, shaping the
world around it to suit its needs - man the subject. If anything, this image, which has its origin in
Enlightenment thought, is viewed with disdain by many in the current climate and I think that this
informs the emphasis of Evolutionary Psychology. For all Pinker's protestations he is to some extent
claiming that we are at the mercy of these predispositions, i.e. that there is some likelihood of us
acting on them for, if there were not, there would be no point in mentioning them!
Steven Pinker went on to talk about the differences between the sexes. He observed that there are
more men than women in mechanical engineering, while the opposite is true in the study of
languages. This is often attributed to discrimination and inequality but doing so discounts the
possibility that human nature plays a part. Matt Ridley asked him if there is not a risk of legitimising
prejudice by rehearsing such arguments. Pinker thinks not. He believes that it is important to defend
principles such as equality, but dangerous to use innate arguments in their defence because they are
open to being disproved. He thinks we should clarify why we oppose discrimination and argues that
there is nothing progressive about thinking that all professions should be made up of 50% of each
sex.
Matt Ridley asked where this leaves the meritocracy, to which Pinker replied simply that being
selected for a job on the basis of your qualifications is not unreasonable; while there are genetic
differences between individuals that is not the best way to target selection criteria for a job! Similarly,
asked where this leaves the notion of personal responsibility Pinker simply said that it shouldn't be a
worry. The genetic argument is in essence no different from the environmental one for Pinker and any
attempt to deny responsibility for one's actions shouldn't carry much weight. Up to now attempts to
use such arguments as mitigation have rarely worked in court.
Matt Ridley drew attention to Pinker's comment that 'behavioural science is not for cissys' - what did
he mean and did this affect his views? Pinker answered that many notions seen as beyond the pale
today and that it can literally be dangerous to be a social scientist in the current climate - some theorists
have been physically attacked for stating certain views. He added that any claim about human nature
pushed peoples buttons, and one has the sense that Pinker likes to do exactly that. It is here that I
have the most sympathy for Pinker's approach, for the questions raised by his comments are
important ones worthy of discussion whether you agree with his conclusions or not.
For the remainder of the hour questions were taken from the floor. Asked how he can talk of human
nature as unified concept, Pinker made the point that, because we are the products of natural
selection there is genetic variation among individuals. However, there are more commonalities than
differences and it is these that he describes as human nature. Pinker was asked to comment on the
fact that, as adult human beings, we make choices about how we act; this is not a denial of human
nature, merely a recognition that we control our own actions. Pinker does not see our ability to make
choices as an 'inscrutable process of free will.' This is not a denial of choice, but a denial that choices
do not have causes. Pinker thinks there is no 'ghost in the machine' outside of the purview of physical
laws. There is only the human brain, a physical object which is to a great extent predictable, more so
than we might like to admit.
So what can be concluded from these two discussions? Both speakers agree that neither nature nor
nurture are entirely responsible for determining what and who we are, but some combination of the
two. While John Dupre rejects the absolutism of attempting to understand everything in terms of
genes, he explicitly states that he doesn't doubt that we each have different dispositions to particular
types of behaviour. Similarly, Steven Pinker may emphasise our evolutionary heritage, but recognises
the importance of society in forming our nature. Yet there is a definite disagreement here. Dupre's
emphasis on development makes an important point about the way the human mind is formed - it
may not be a blank slate on which the mind is drawn, but our experiences and environment are critical
in making us what we are, and those factors are very different across societies and, even more,
across the centuries. Thus he rejects the notion that Evolutionary Psychology is looking in the right
place for answers to questions about our nature. Pinker uses language which obscures how his view
differs from this. In his terminology human nature refers to the evolved traits which conferred our
stone age cousins (or rather their genes) with some survival advantage, i.e. to adaptations. Aspects of
the human condition which are derived from the social would thus not fall into his definition of our
nature, although he does accept that they play a part in making us what we are. I think that both
arguments miss some essential points about what human beings are.
Human beings are unique in many ways. We have language, make societies and adapt our
environment to suit our needs rather than vice versa. We invent ethics, morality and
science. Most
importantly we have sophisticated minds that enable us to reflect on our actions and
to exceed our
genetic and cultural programming. As Kenan Malik
points out in his article
What Can Science Tell Us About Human Nature?
we do things for reasons. This aspect of the special nature of humanity does
not signify in the arguments of Dupre or Pinker. I think this is fundamentally important.
Human beings are not at the mercy of their genes or their upbringing. When we become adults we
make choices about the way that we behave and this provides the basis of all our ideas about
individual responsibility and freedom. When we act it is rarely in an arbitrary way and, in fact, what
gives us our free will is precisely this ability to decide how to act based on reasons. These aspects of
what we are needs to be injected back into the discussion of human nature.
Caspar Hewett, 2nd October 2002
C.J.M.Hewett@ncl.ac.uk